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NUFARM AMERICA'S, INC. V.
UNITED STATES: THE FIRST EXPORT
CLAUSE CHALLENGE TO NAFTA's
DEFERRED TAX PROVISION
William Richmond*
N February 2007, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled against
Nufarm America's, Inc. ("Nufarm")1 on its challenge of customs
taxes imposed by the United States under statutes enacted in accor-
dance with article 303 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA art. 303").2 In May 2008, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling on the case, a case that
remains the first constitutional challenge to the duty-deferral program
under NAFTA art. 303. 3 Despite these decisions, Nufarm should appeal
its case to the U.S. Supreme Court on the strength of its legal reasoning.
A favorable decision would significantly alter the tax structure under
NAFTA art. 303 by making the duty-deferral program unconstitutional.
This note's review addresses the statutory provisions challenged, the facts
and issues of Nufarm's initial challenge, the Court of International
Trade's decision, both parties' briefs on appeal to the Federal Circuit, the
Federal Circuit decision, and the reasons why Nufarm should pursue this
constitutional challenge to the nation's highest court.
I. CHALLENGED REGULATIONS AND FACTUAL BASIS
In response to the signing of NAFTA in December 1992,4 the U.S.
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law (2009);
B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia (2006). The author wishes to express his
indebtedness to the following: Scott & Alice Richmond, Judith Mitchell-Miller,
Randy Pierce, and Andrew Stewart.
1. Nufarm is an international company based in Melbourne, Australia, that manufac-
tures a variety of crop protection products such as pesticides and herbicides.
Nufarm.com, About - Nufarm, http://www.nufarm.com/About (last visited May
20, 2008).
2. Nufarm America's, Inc. v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1291 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2007) [hereinafter "Nufarm II"].
3. Nufarm America's, Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1366, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) here-
inafter ["Nufarm Hir'].
4. The article relevant to this case is art. 303(1) and its corresponding United States
Customs notation, Chapter 98, Subchapter XIII, U.S. Note 1(c), available at http://
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/importlinternational agreements/free trade/nafta/repairs_
alterations/chpt_98.xml).
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Code of Federal Regulations was updated with title 19, chapter I, part 181
to cover the regulation of duties and other U.S. Customs responsibilities.5
Section 181.53, entitled "Collection and waiver or reduction of duty
under duty-deferral programs," governs the imposition, assessment, and
deferral of duties on goods moving between NAFTA-party countries. 6
Most relevant to Nufarm's constitutional challenge, under the sub-head-
ing of "Assessment and waiver or reduction of duty," section 181.53
states:
(5) Temporary importation under bond. Except in the case of a good
imported from Canada or Mexico for repair or alteration, where a
good, regardless of its origin, was imported temporarily free of duty
for repair, alteration or processing (subheading 9813.00.05, Harmo-
nized Tariff Schedule of the United States ["HTSUS"]) and is subse-
quently exported to Canada or Mexico, duty shall be assessed on the
good on the basis of its condition at the time of its importation into
the United States. Such duty shall be paid no later than 60 calendar
days after either the date of exportation or the date of entry into a
duty-deferral program of Canada or Mexico, except that, upon filing
of a proper claim under paragraph (a)(3) of this section, the duty
shall be waived or reduced in an amount that does not exceed the
lesser of the total amount of duty payable on the good under this
section or the total amount of customs duties paid to Canada or
Mexico.7
Under the appropriate HTSUS subheading for goods imported for re-
pair, alteration, or processing, Nufarm imported chemical products for
modification in the United States.8 These products were intended for
processing into herbicides in Montana and eventual exportation to Ca-
5. 19 C.F.R. § 181.0 (2008): "This part implements the duty preference and related
Customs provisions applicable to imported goods under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (the NAFTA) entered into on December 17, 1992, and under
the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (107 Stat. 2057)
(the Act)."
6. Id. § 181.53.
7. Id. § 181.53(b)(5). The example following the provision shed little light on the is-
sue before the court:
Example Company A imports glassware under subheading 9813.00.05,
HTSUS. The glassware is from France and would be dutiable under a
regular consumption entry at $6,000. Company A alters the glassware by
etching hotel logos on the glassware. Two weeks later, Company A sells
the glassware to Company B, a Mexican company, and ships the glass-
ware to Mexico. Company B enters the glassware and is assessed duties
in an amount equivalent to US$6,200 and claims NAFTA preferential
tariff treatment. Company B provides a copy of the Mexican landing cer-
tificate to Company A showing that the US$6,200 equivalent in duties
was assessed but not yet paid to Mexico. If Mexico ultimately denies
Company B's NAFTA claim and the Mexican duty payment becomes
final, Company A, upon submission to Customs of a proper claim under
paragraph (a)(3) of this section, is entitled to a waiver of the full $6,000
in U.S. duty.
8. Nufarm H, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. The customs provision was Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS") subheading 9813.00.05.
"NUFARM AMERICA'S, INC."
nada.9 More importantly, the goods were allowed to enter the United
States without Nufarm having to pay a duty on them, the duty having
been deferred until the time of export.10
Upon processing, the goods were exported to Canada; subsequently,
the U.S. Customs Service ("Customs") demanded the duties.1 After
some delay, Nufarm paid the required amounts and recorded numerous
administrative challenges to the duties; these challenges were denied. 12
Ultimately, Nufarm filed an action in the Court of International Trade to
recover the amounts paid and challenge the constitutionality of the regu-
lation.13 After establishing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1581(a),
the Court proceeded to the merits of Nufarm's challenge. 14
II. NUFARM'S INITIAL EXPORT CLAUSE CHALLENGE
At the very heart of Nufarm's challenge was the actual process and
implications of the duty-deferral program under section 181.53.15
Nufarm's challenge was in its Motion for Summary Judgment, to which
the United States filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 16
Nufarm's motion attacked the imposition of the export duties as a viola-
tion of the U.S. Constitution's Export Clause and the subsequent case law
set down by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the broad breadth of the
Clause's protection. 17 In the initial action, Nufarm only challenged the
constitutionality of 19 C.F.R. section 181.53, the provision adopted in ac-
cordance with NAFTA art. 303.
A. FACIAL CHALLENGE
In its first attack, Nufarm challenged the duty-deferral program as a
facial violation of the Export Clause because, as it alleged, the language
of the regulations assessed a duty on a good temporarily in the United
States free of financial obligations at the time of export to another
9. Brief of Appellee at 3, Nufarm America's, Inc. v. United States, No. 2007-1220
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter referred to as "Government's Brief"].
10. Id. The duties were imported under a special program (Temporary Importation
Under Bond: TIB) that allows an importer to post a bond on the imported goods
or pay the duty of a consumed item. Id. at n.1.
11. Nufarm 11, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
12. Id.
13. Nufarm America's, Inc. v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1353-1354 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2005) [hereinafter "Nufarm "].
14. Id. at 1349; Nufarm H, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
15. Most of the arguments raised in the Court of International Trade were reiterated
in Nufarm's brief on appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Brief of Ap-
pellant, Nufarm America's, Inc. v. United States, No. 2007-1220 (Fed. Cir. May 21,
2007), available at 2007 WL 1768189 [hereinafter referred to as "Nufarm's Brief"].
The arguments are addressed together to avoid needless repetition. Also ad-
dressed together are Nufarm's reply brief arguments. Brief of Appellant (Reply),
Nufarm America's Inc. v. United States, No. 2007-1220 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 2007),
available at 2007 WL 2945110.
16. Nufarm 11, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
17. Id. at 1294 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5.).
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NAFTA-party country.' 8 As the foundation of its argument, Nufarm re-
lied on statements from Supreme Court holdings that require a broad
reading of what constitutes an export tax: United States v. IBM ("The
Export Claus[e] ... has been afforded a broad construction historically
and consistently to prohibit Congress from laying any tax or duty on ex-
ports"),19 United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp. ("IBM plainly stated that the
Export Clause's simple, direct, unqualified prohibition on any taxes or
duties distinguishes it from other constitutional limitations on govern-
mental taxing authority."), 20 and Fairbank v. United States ("The [Export
Clause] require[s] ... that exports should be free from any government
burden."). 21
Although the Court of International Trade acknowledged the broad
protection afforded by the Export Clause, the Court dismissed the facial
challenge with a broader reading of the regulation and an emphasis on
the language in 19 C.F.R. section 181.53(b)(5). 22 The Court reasoned
that the basis of the deferral was, in the first place, "assessed on the good
on the basis of its condition at the time of its importation into the United
States."' 23 As a preface to this narrow reading of section 181.53, the
Court noted that one of the stated goals of NAFTA art. 303 is to avoid
trade preference abuse "by requiring that duties be paid on non-NAFTA
components of goods exported to NAFTA countries, thus guarding
against the establishment of 'export platforms,' or importing goods solely
for the purpose of later exporting them in order to avoid duties that
would have otherwise been assessed." 24
B. As-APPLIED CHALLENGE
In its second attack, Nufarm challenged the operation of the program
as an as-applied violation of the export clause. Nufarm contended that
the duties imposed under the regulation were operationally unconstitu-
tional because they were applied not to all goods imported under the
particular HTSUS subheading, but only applied against goods for export
to Mexico or Canada.25 The Court of International Trade summarized
Nufarm's position as arguing that "for all other imports the obligation to
pay duty is avoided by exporting to a non-NAFTA country and arises by
failing to export." 26
18. Id. at 1295 n.11 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 181.53) ("[W]here a good ...was imported
temporarily free of duty for repair, alteration or processing... and it subsequently
exported to Canada or Mexico, duty shall be assessed on the good ....").
19. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 10 (citing United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843, 861
(1996)).
20. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 10 (citing United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523
U.S. 360, 368 (1998)).
21. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 10 (citing Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283,
290 (1901)).
22. Nufarm i, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1294-95.
25. Id. at 1295-96.
26. Id. at 1296.
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Using this characterization of the duty-deferral program (that the items
were in the process of exportation from the moment they were imported
and taxed), Nufarm relied on two Supreme Court holdings protecting in-
process exports from duties.27 In Cornell v. Coyne, the Supreme Court
held that the constitutional prohibition of duties on exports "does not
mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior ordinary burdens
of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situated. The exemp-
tion attaches to the export and not to the article before its exportation. '28
Similarly, in A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, the Supreme Court held
that any type of tax on goods "in the export process" is a violation of the
Export Clause. 29 Nufarm interpreted these cases as forming a penumbra
of protection against duties for goods closely related to the export pro-
cess, such as the duty-deferral program under 19 C.F.R. section 181.53.30
The Court of International Trade, however, dismissed this argument
and held the duty-deferral program to be constitutional in light of the
holding in the Supreme Court's opinion in Pace v. Burgess:
The stamp was intended for no other purpose than to separate and
identify the tobacco which the manufacturer desired to export and
thereby, instead of taxing it, to relieve it from the taxation to which
other tobacco was subjected. It was a means devised to prevent
fraud, and secure the faithful carrying out of the declared intent with
regard to the tobacco so marked. 31
Applying Pace, the Court of International Trade noted, "[cilearly there is
a distinction between charges imposed for reasons independent of the
export process and those in place due to an item's export. ' 32 The Court
re-characterized the issue as "whether the duty is placed on all imports
alike" and found that "every importer meeting the 19 C.F.R. § 181.53
standard has the same option of paying the duty immediately or deferring
payment to a later date."'33 The Court quickly dismissed the idea that
simply because "events occurring subsequent to importation could result
in the waiver or reduction of the duty" that all the goods imported and
subject to the choice were not "similarly situated" as required under the
27. Id. at 1296 (citing Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904)).
28. In Cornell, a federal statute required that all filled cheese be taxed at one cent per
pound upon manufacture. A manufacturer challenged the tax as a violation of the
Export Clause because all of the products were intended for exportation to foreign
countries. The Court held that such a tax is not a burden to exportation because
all cheese products, regardless of their intention for exportation, were taxed the
same. The Court noted, however, that the exemption attaches to the export, and
not to the article before its exportation. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427.
29. A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1923). This case tracks the
reasoning used by the Court in Turpin v. Burgess that a general tax laid on all
property alike, and not levied on goods in the course of exportation nor because of
their intended exportation, is not within the constitutional prohibition. Turpin v.
Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 506-08 (1886).
30. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 13.
31. Nufarm 11, 477 F. Supp. 2d. at 1296 (citing Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 374-75
(1876)).
32. Nufarm II, 477 F. Supp. 2d. at 1297.
33. Id.
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Pace and Cornell holdings.34 Furthermore, the Court found this interpre-
tation bolstered in light of the similarities between the fraud-prevention
purpose of the tax stamps in Pace and the purpose of NAFTA art. 303 to
discourage use of the United States as an "export platform." 35
Nufarm also contended that, because the regulation assesses duties at
the time of export and the regulation's language requires payment of du-
ties after export, the regulation was a de facto burden applied solely to
NAFTA-party exports and thus a violation of the Export Clause. 36 As
the final reason for upholding the program, the Court relied on its own
recent decision in Ammex, Inc. v. United States, affirmed by the Federal
Circuit.37 Ammex asserted that there is a functional difference between
the imposition of duties (i.e., the responsibility to pay a particular duty)
and the assessment of duties (i.e., fixing of specific amounts of liability).38
Applying these concepts to Nufarm, the Court of International Trade
found that the "regulation in question clearly meets constitutional stan-
dards by imposing duties on imports, allowing for temporary duty defer-
ral, and then assessing duties at the time of export. '39
Ultimately, the Court of International Trade denied Nufarm's Motion
for Summary Judgment and granted the government's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment.40
III. NEW ARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES ON APPEAL
In May 2007, Nufarm filed its brief with the Federal Circuit to appeal
the Court of International Trade's decision. 41 Although Nufarm's facial
challenge remained virtually the same, its operational challenge to sec-
tion 181.53 was augmented by a direct challenge to NAFTA art. 303 and
its corresponding Customs note. 42
First, using the Court of International Trade's own language that held
NAFTA art. 303's duty-deferral program was the protection of abuse
through exported component goods, Nufarm contended the Court's deci-
sion was internally inconsistent.43 Furthermore, Nufarm argued that the
34. Id.
35. Id. Despite the stated goal of banning export platforms, NAFTA has allowed
party countries to become such locations, and not always against the wishes of the
party. See, e.g., Juan C. Moreno-Brid et. al., NAFTA and the Mexican Economy: A
Look Back on a Ten-Year Relationship, 30 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 997, 1007
(Summer 2005) ("The preferential access granted by NAFTA led to a strong in-
crease in Mexico's exports ... Mexico's export market benefited from the arrival
of foreign investment in selected sectors, most of which was motivated by the op-
portunity or need to use Mexico as an export platform to the United States.").
36. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 22-23.
37. Nufarm II, 477 F. Supp. 2d. at 1297 (citing Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.
Supp. 2d 1308 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004), affd, 419 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
38. Ammex, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1312-13.
39. Nufarm 11, 477 F. Supp. 2d. at 1297.
40. Id.
41. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at i.
42. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 13.
43. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 14 n.10.
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duty-deferral is aimed at exports only because 19 C.F.R. section
181.53(a)(2)(i)(A) requires the exporting company to file documentation
only at the time of export; any interest calculation on the duties run from
the payment deadline after the goods are exported, not the date the
goods are imported; and bond payments securing the payments of the
import duties due are not required until after the goods are exported. 44
In its response, the government argued that these incidences of the
duty-deferral program do not alter the regulation's language imposing the
duties at import and not export.45 The government contended that be-
cause the assessment of the duties, interests, and related bonds are not
made until the importer has designated the destination party (the duty-
deferral changes are based on the destination country's taxation schedule,
which is different in Canada and Mexico), these assessments are merely
taxes already imposed at the time of import.46
Most importantly, in a clarification of its previous argument, Nufarm
contended that the instant case is not governed by Cornell's framework of
"similarly situated" products, but instead is more analogous to the type of
regulatory conduct addressed in A.G. Spalding.47 In A.G. Spalding, the
Supreme Court held that "when the very act that incurs a tax in a wholly
domestic transaction is the same act that places the goods in the course of
export in an international transaction, such tax is then impermissible
under the Export Clause."' 48 As one commentator has noted, this argu-
ment is a strong one and is at least argumentatively meritorious when
considering that without the program there would be no tax at all. 49 In
response, the government's brief paralleled the Court of International
Trade's contention that, in light of Ammex, Inc. v. United States, the regu-
lation has merely assessed the taxes at the time of export, having already
imposed the taxes at the time of import.5 0
44. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 17.
45. Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 29-31, 36.
46. Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 36-37.
47. Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 23.
48. Id. at 23 n.21 (citing A.G. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 69-70).
49. Posting of Lawrence Friedman to Customs Law Blog, http://customslaw.blogspot.
com/2007/02/is-nafta-drawback-constitutional.html (Feb. 22, 2007, 09:59 CST)
[hereinafter Customs Law Blog]. Mr. Friedman is an international law attorney
with Barnes Richardson of Chicago, Ill., who maintains a blog entitled "Customs
Law Blog." His commentary noted the relevant hypothetical:
Assume for a minute that NAFTA was not involved. The merchandise
comes in on a TIB and is subsequently exported. No duties are owed.
That means that in a TIB situation like Nufarm's, importation does not
result in a duty liability. Neither would exportation. But the NAFTA
drawback rules change the result. The goods come in free of duty just
like any TIB. Duty liability only attaches when exported and only when
exported to Canada or Mexico. It seems reasonable to conclude that the
NAFTA drawback rule creates duty liability that would not otherwise
exist and that it is triggered by the exporter's choice to ship to Canada or
Mexico as opposed to any other destination.
50. Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 31-32.
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Nufarm's contention-that the discriminatory assessment of taxes on
goods bound for NAFTA-parties as opposed to a blanket tax on all ex-
ports is implicit of the regulation's goal of placing a burden on exports-
was attacked by the government a second way. The government con-
tended that Nufarm's argument is merely "a complaint that import duties
are not assessed evenly" and that "such a complaint is not a violation of
the Export clause."'5' But this government claim was set forth without
any type of supporting authority. Instead, the government quickly shifted
the argument to the need for such a tax as opposed to the tax's constitu-
tionality, much like the lower court did in its opinion.5 2
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINION
In April 2008, Judge Randall R. Rader of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit issued a decision on Nufarm's appeal affirming the
lower court's decision.53 The Federal Circuit's decision relied heavily on
the government's legal analysis and interpretive liberties. This reliance
resulted in the court establishing three main grounds for dismissing
Nufarm's challenge, all three of which are based on flawed legal reason-
ing and interpretative decisions.
First, the Federal Circuit held that all arguments not raised by Nufarm
in the Court of International Trade, specifically those regarding Note
1(c), were per se without merit and beyond consideration. 54 No reason
was voiced as to why these arguments were without merit, and the hold-
ing was based on scant precedent: the only citation is to Judge Rader's
dissent from a 1995 decision. 55 What little precedential value this refer-
ence may have is seriously undermined by the unsupported dissent, which
asserts that the decision to ignore new arguments on appeal is merely a
general proposition. 56 Furthermore, the decision to ignore the new argu-
ments runs contrary to the court's acknowledgment that this constitu-
tional challenge is under a de novo review.5 7 Appeals of Court of
International Trade summary judgments are reviewed "for correctness as
a matter of law, deciding de novo the proper interpretation of the gov-
erning statute and regulations as well as whether genuine issues of mate-
rial fact exist."' 58 This language does not carve out any arguments as
excluded from consideration, making the Federal Circuit's decision here
an anomaly.
51. Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 33.
52. Compare Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 33 with Nufarm I!, 477 F. Supp. 2d.
at 1297.
53. Nufarm 111, 521 F.3d at 1367.
54. Id. at 1368.
55. Id. (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Rader, J.,
dissenting)).
56. Henke, 60 F.3d at 802.
57. Nufarm 111, 521 F.3d at 1368.
58. Id. (citing Texaco Marine Servs., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1539, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
"NUFARM AMERICA'S, INC."
Second, the Federal Circuit quickly dismissed the facial and as-applied
challenges on the grounds that the references in the regulations to the
goods' initial status as an import trump the multiple references later in
the regulations to the goods' status as an export.59 Like the government
argued in its brief, the Federal Circuit held that the regulation reads as an
import tariff simply because a portion of the tariff-imposition process re-
quires that the good have been imported under HTSUS subheading
9813.0005.60 But this analysis is a casual dismissal of the plain meaning of
the regulation because the statute itself, as the Federal Circuit acknowl-
edges, is significantly based on both the imported goods' subsequent sta-
tus as an export and the goods' actual entrance into the exportation
process.6 1 The court's unsupported conclusion that any references to "ex-
ported goods" later in the regulations are "merely references, in different
terms, to the imported goods"6 2 ignores Nufarm's argument. The more
straightforward reading of the text-that the triggering mechanism for
the tariff is not the act of importation but the act of exportation-makes
this provision unconstitutional.63
Third, the court's textual analysis of the words "assessment" and "im-
position" formed the basis of its conclusion for the imposition of liability
at the time of import, but the analysis ignored pivotal language in the
regulations that tie the imposition of taxation to the export process. 64
While Ammex, Inc. v. United States holds that an "assessment" is the cal-
culation of a tariff's amount while "imposition" refers to the moment an
entity becomes liable for the assessed amount, the Federal Circuit's appli-
cation of these definitions to the Nufarm case resulted in an unsupported,
conclusory statement that the regulation imposes the tariff at import and
simply delays assessment until exportation. 65 In fact, the Federal Circuit
contradicts itself on this point: where in one statement the court holds "19
C.F.R. § 181.53 imposes liability upon import while postponing the as-
sessment of the amount of the previously imposed importation duty," the
court also holds that "[it] is aware that the obligation to pay the duty only
arises upon export to a NAFTA country. '66 Under such conflicting state-
ments, the conclusion drawn from the Federal Circuit's decision is that
Nufarm's liability for the tariff, and the deciding time as to whether this
tariff is a constitutional import tax or an unconstitutional export tax, is
both at the moment of importation and at the time of exportation.6 7 Re-
59. Nufarm I11, 521 F.3d at 1368-70.
60. Compare Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 29-31, 36 with Nufarm 111, 521 F.3d
at 1368-69.
61. Nufarm I11, 521 F.3d at 1369.
62. Id.
63. See Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 22-23.
64. Nufarm I1, 521 F.3d at 1370.
65. Id. ("The regulatory language that ties the due date to export does not convert the
import duty into an export tax. This timing clause operates to set a time for the
accrual and computation of interest. Once again, this procedure does not change
the imposition of liability at importation.") (citing Ammex, 419 F.3d at 1345).
66. Nufarm 11I, 521 F.3d at 1370.
67. See id.
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gardless of the time of assessment, the regulation was improperly upheld
because the language of the regulation that results is susceptible to two
contradictory readings, one of which places the tariff at the time of export
and thus in the realm of unconstitutionality.68
V. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
While Nufarm's challenge has reached a momentary resting point as
Nufarm contemplates an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the argu-
ments and ideas presented in the challenge are legitimate claims of un-
constitutionality that implicate the broader duty-deferral and drawback
schemes of NAFTA art. 303 and its corresponding U. S. regulations and
statutes. 69 If these schemes are struck down by the Supreme Court, the
fears addressed by the Court of International Trade and the govern-
ment-that the United States would become a mere export platform for
items bearing the "Made in the U.S.A." emblem-would most likely be
dealt with by completely revising the program. 70 But the striking down of
the current program, as Nufarm would surely argue, would serve to up-
hold the precedential tradition of the Export Clause in casting a wide
shield of protection on goods merely making their way through the ex-
port process. 71
68. See Allen v. City of Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 (1880) (holding that where one
part of a statute is held unconstitutional, all other portions of the statute that are
"mutually connected with and dependent" on the unconstitutional portion must
also be struck down as unconstitutional).
69. See Customs Law Blog, supra note 49.
70. Compare Government's Brief, supra note 9, at 33 with Nufarm II, 477 F. Supp. 2d.
at 1297.
71. See Nufarm's Brief, supra note 15, at 13.
